Aristotle defines the rhetorician as someone who is always able to see what is persuasive Topics VI. Correspondingly, rhetoric is defined as the ability to see what is possibly persuasive in every given case Rhet. This is not to say that the rhetorician will be able to convince under all circumstances.

Rather he is in a situation similar to that of the physician: the latter has a complete grasp of his art only if he neglects nothing that might heal his patient, though he is not able to heal every patient.

Similarly, the rhetorician has a complete grasp of his method, if he discovers the available means of persuasion, though he is not able to convince everybody. Aristotelian rhetoric as such is a neutral tool that can be used by persons of virtuous or depraved character. This capacity can be used for good or bad purposes; it can cause great benefits as well as great harms. There is no doubt that Aristotle himself regards his system of rhetoric as something useful, but the good purposes for which rhetoric is useful do not define the rhetorical capacity as such.

Thus, Aristotle does not hesitate to concede on the one hand that his art of rhetoric can be misused. But on the other hand he tones down the risk of misuse by stressing several factors: Generally, it is true of all goods, except virtue, that they can be misused. Secondly, using rhetoric of the Aristotelian style, it is easier to convince of the just and good than of their opposites. Finally, the risk of misuse is compensated by the benefits that can be accomplished by rhetoric of the Aristotelian style.

It could still be objected that rhetoric is only useful for those who want to outwit their audience and conceal their real aims, since someone who just wants to communicate the truth could be straightforward and would not need rhetorical tools.

This, however, is not Aristotle's point of view: Even those who just try to establish what is just and true need the help of rhetoric when they are faced with a public audience.

Aristotle tells us that it is impossible to teach such an audience, even if the speaker had the most exact knowledge of the subject. Obviously he thinks that the audience of a public speech consists of ordinary people who are not able to follow an exact proof based on the principles of a science.

Further, such an audience can easily be distracted by factors that do not pertain to the subject at all; sometimes they are receptive to flattery or just try to increase their own advantage. And this situation becomes even worse if the constitution, the laws, and the rhetorical habits in a city are bad. Finally, most of the topics that are usually discussed in public speeches do not allow of exact knowledge, but leave room for doubt; especially in such cases it is important that the speaker seems to be a credible person and that the audience is in a sympathetic mood.

For all those reasons, affecting the decisions of juries and assemblies is a matter of persuasiveness, not of knowledge. It is true that some people manage to be persuasive either at random or by habit, but it is rhetoric that gives us a method to discover all means of persuasion on any topic whatsoever.

Aristotle joins Plato in criticizing contemporary manuals of rhetoric. But how does he manage to distinguish his own project from the criticized manuals?

The general idea seems to be this: Previous theorists of rhetoric gave most of their attention to methods outside the subject; they taught how to slander, how to arouse emotions in the audience, or how to distract the attention of the hearers from the subject. This style of rhetoric promotes a situation in which juries and assemblies no longer form rational judgments about the given issues, but surrender to the litigants.

Since people are most strongly convinced when they suppose that something has been proven Rhet. In Aristotle's view an orator will be even more successful when he just picks up the convincing aspects of a given issue, thereby using commonly-held opinions as premises. Since people have a natural disposition for the true Rhet. Of course, Aristotle's rhetoric covers non-argumentative tools of persuasion as well. It is understandable that several interpreters found an insoluble tension between the argumentative means of pertinent rhetoric and non-argumentative tools that aim at what is outside the subject.

It does not seem, however, that Aristotle himself saw a major conflict between these diverse tools of persuasion—presumably for the following reasons: i He leaves no doubt that the subject that is treated in a speech has the highest priority e.

Thus, it is not surprising that there are even passages that regard the non-argumentative tools as a sort of accidental contribution to the process of persuasion, which essentially proceeds in the manner of dialectic cp. His point seems to be that the argumentative method becomes less effective, the worse the condition of the audience is. This again is to say that it is due to the badness of the audience when his rhetoric includes aspects that are not in line with the idea of argumentative and pertinent rhetoric.

The prologue of a speech, for example, was traditionally used for appeals to the listener, but it can also be used to set out the issue of the speech, thus contributing to its clearness. Similarly, the epilogue has traditionally been used to arouse emotions like pity or anger; but as soon as the epilogue recalls the conclusions reached, it will make the speech more understandable.

The systematical core of Aristotle's Rhetoric is the doctrine that there are three technical means of persuasion. Further, methodical persuasion must rest on a complete analysis of what it means to be persuasive. A speech consists of three things: the speaker, the subject that is treated in the speech, and the listener to whom the speech is addressed Rhet.

It seems that this is why only three technical means of persuasion are possible: Technical means of persuasion are either a in the character of the speaker, or b in the emotional state of the hearer, or c in the argument logos itself. If the speaker appears to be credible, the audience will form the second-order judgment that propositions put forward by the credible speaker are true or acceptable. This is especially important in cases where there is no exact knowledge but room for doubt.

But how does the speaker manage to appear a credible person? Again, if he displayed i without ii and iii , the audience could doubt whether the aims of the speaker are good. Finally, if he displayed i and ii without iii , the audience could still doubt whether the speaker gives the best suggestion, though he knows what it is. But if he displays all of them, Aristotle concludes, it cannot rationally be doubted that his suggestions are credible.

It must be stressed that the speaker must accomplish these effects by what he says; it is not necessary that he is actually virtuous: on the contrary, a preexisting good character cannot be part of the technical means of persuasion.

Thus, the orator has to arouse emotions exactly because emotions have the power to modify our judgments: to a judge who is in a friendly mood, the person about whom he is going to judge seems not to do wrong or only in a small way; but to the judge who is in an angry mood, the same person will seem to do the opposite cp. Many interpreters writing on the rhetorical emotions were misled by the role of the emotions in Aristotle's ethics: they suggested that the orator has to arouse the emotions in order i to motivate the audience or ii to make them better persons since Aristotle requires that virtuous persons do the right things together with the right emotions.

Thesis i is false for the simple reason that the aim of rhetorical persuasion is a certain judgment krisis , not an action or practical decision prohairesis. How is it possible for the orator to bring the audience to a certain emotion? Aristotle's technique essentially rests on the knowledge of the definition of every significant emotion. According to such a definition, someone who believes that he has suffered a slight from a person who is not entitled to do so, etc.

If we take such a definition for granted, it is possible to deduce circumstances in which a person will most probably be angry; for example, we can deduce i in what state of mind people are angry and ii against whom they are angry and iii for what sorts of reason. Aristotle deduces these three factors for several emotions in the chapters II. With this equipment, the orator will be able, for example, to highlight such characteristics of a case as are likely to provoke anger in the audience.

In comparison with the tricks of former rhetoricians, this method of arousing emotions has a striking advantage: The orator who wants to arouse emotions must not even speak outside the subject; it is sufficient to detect aspects of a given subject that are causally connected with the intended emotion. For Aristotle, there are two species of arguments: inductions and deductions Posterior Analytics I.

A deduction sullogismos is an argument in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the suppositions results of necessity through them Topics I. The inductive argument in rhetoric is the example paradeigma ; unlike other inductive arguments, it does not proceed from many particular cases to one universal case, but from one particular to a similar particular if both particulars fall under the same genus Rhet. At first glance, this seems to be inconsistent, since a non-necessary inference is no longer a deduction.

If the former interpretation is true, then Aristotle concedes in the very definition of the enthymeme that some enthymemes are not deductive. But if the latter interpretation which has a parallel in An.

For Aristotle, an enthymeme is what has the function of a proof or demonstration in the domain of public speech, since a demonstration is a kind of sullogismos and the enthymeme is said to be a sullogismos too.

In general, Aristotle regards deductive arguments as a set of sentences in which some sentences are premises and one is the conclusion, and the inference from the premises to the conclusion is guaranteed by the premises alone. Since enthymemes in the proper sense are expected to be deductive arguments, the minimal requirement for the formulation of enthymemes is that they have to display the premise-conclusion structure of deductive arguments.

This is why enthymemes have to include a statement as well as a kind of reason for the given statement. The reason why the enthymeme, as the rhetorical kind of proof or demonstration, should be regarded as central to the rhetorical process of persuasion is that we are most easily persuaded when we think that something has been demonstrated. Hence, the basic idea of a rhetorical demonstration seems to be this: In order to make a target group believe that q , the orator must first select a sentence p or some sentences p 1 … p n that are already accepted by the target group; secondly he has to show that q can be derived from p or p 1 … p n , using p or p 1 … p n as premises.

Given that the target persons form their beliefs in accordance with rational standards, they will accept q as soon as they understand that q can be demonstrated on the basis of their own opinions.

Consequently, the construction of enthymemes is primarily a matter of deducing from accepted opinions endoxa. That a deduction is made from accepted opinions—as opposed to deductions from first and true sentences or principles—is the defining feature of dialectical argumentation in the Aristotelian sense.

Thus, the formulation of enthymemes is a matter of dialectic, and the dialectician has the competence that is needed for the construction of enthymemes. However, in the rhetorical context there are two factors that the dialectician has to keep in mind if she wants to become a rhetorician too, and if the dialectical argument is to become a successful enthymeme.

First, the typical subjects of public speech do not—as the subject of dialectic and theoretical philosophy—belong to the things that are necessarily the case, but are among those things that are the goal of practical deliberation and can also be otherwise.

Second, as opposed to well-trained dialecticians the audience of public speech is characterized by an intellectual insufficiency; above all, the members of a jury or assembly are not accustomed to following a longer chain of inferences.

Therefore enthymemes must not be as precise as a scientific demonstration and should be shorter than ordinary dialectical arguments. This, however, is not to say that the enthymeme is defined by incompleteness and brevity.

Rather, it is a sign of a well-executed enthymeme that the content and the number of its premises are adjusted to the intellectual capacities of the public audience; but even an enthymeme that failed to incorporate these qualities would still be enthymeme. In a well known passage Rhet. Properly understood, both passages are about the selection of appropriate premises, not about logical incompleteness.

The remark that enthymemes often have few or less premises concludes the discussion of two possible mistakes the orator could make Rhet. The latter method is unpersuasive, for the premises are not accepted, nor have they been introduced. The former method is problematic, too: if the orator has to introduce the needed premises by another deduction, and the premises of this pre-deduction too, etc.

Arguments with several deductive steps are common in dialectical practice, but one cannot expect the audience of a public speech to follow such long arguments.

This is why Aristotle says that the enthymeme is and should be from fewer premises. Just as there is a difference between real and apparent or fallacious deductions in dialectic, we have to distinguish between real and apparent or fallacious enthymemes in rhetoric. The topoi for real enthymemes are given in chapter II. The fallacious enthymeme pretends to include a valid deduction, while it actually rests on a fallacious inference. Note that neither classification interferes with the idea that premises have to be accepted opinions: with respect to the signs, the audience must believe that they exist and accept that they indicate the existence of something else, and with respect to the probabilities, people must accept that something is likely to happen.

However, it is not clear whether this is meant to be an exhaustive typology. But there are several types of sign-arguments too; Aristotle offers the following examples:. Sign-arguments of type i and iii can always be refuted, even if the premises are true; that is to say that they do not include a valid deduction sullogismos ; Aristotle calls them asullogistos non-deductive.

Sign-arguments of type ii can never be refuted if the premise is true, since, for example, it is not possible that someone has fever without being ill, or that someone has milk without having given birth, etc. Now, if some sign-enthymemes are valid deductions and some are not, it is tempting to ask whether Aristotle regarded the non-necessary sign-enthymemes as apparent or fallacious arguments. However, there seems to be a more attractive reading: We accept a fallacious argument only if we are deceived about its logical form.

So it seems as if Aristotle didn't regard all non-necessary sign-arguments as fallacious or deceptive; but even if this is true, it is difficult for Aristotle to determine the sense in which non-necessary sign-enthymemes are valid arguments, since he is bound to the alternative of deduction and induction, and neither class seems appropriate for non-necessary sign-arguments. Cicero, Brutus , 46—48 and Isocrates. Aristotle's book Topics lists some hundred topoi for the construction of dialectical arguments.

These lists of topoi form the core of the method by which the dialectician should be able to formulate deductions on any problem that could be proposed. Most of the instructions that the Rhetoric gives for the composition of enthymemes are also organized as lists of topoi ; especially the first book of the Rhetoric essentially consists of topoi concerning the subjects of the three species of public speech.

It is striking that the work that is almost exclusively dedicated to the collection of topoi , the book Topics , does not even make an attempt to define the concept of topos. According to this definition, the topos is a general argumentative form or pattern, and the concrete arguments are instantiations of the general topos.

That the topos is a general instruction from which several arguments can be derived, is crucial for Aristotle's understanding of an artful method of argumentation; for a teacher of rhetoric who makes his pupils learn ready samples of arguments would not impart the art itself to them, but only the products of this art, just as if someone pretending to teach the art of shoe-making only gave samples of already made shoes to his pupils see Sophistical Refutations b36ff.

By recalling the houses along the street we can also remember the associated items. At least within the system of the book Topics , every given problem must be analyzed in terms of some formal criteria: Does the predicate of the sentence in question ascribe a genus or a definition or peculiar or accidental properties to the subject?

Does the sentence express a sort of opposition, either contradiction or contrariety, etc.? Does the sentence express that something is more or less the case? Does it maintain identity or diversity?

Are the words used linguistically derived from words that are part of an accepted premise? Depending on such formal criteria of the analyzed sentence one has to refer to a fitting topos. For this reason, the succession of topoi in the book Topics is organized in accordance with their salient formal criteria; and this, again, makes a further mnemotechnique superfluous.

More or less the same is true of the Rhetoric —except that most of its topoi are structured by material and not by formal criteria, as we shall see in section 7. Other topoi often include the discussion of iv examples; still other topoi suggest v how to apply the given schemes. Often Aristotle is very brief and leaves it to the reader to add the missing elements. In a nutshell, the function of a topos can be explained as follows.

First of all, one has to select an apt topos for a given conclusion. The conclusion is either a thesis of our opponent that we want to refute, or our own assertion we want to establish or defend. Accordingly, there are two uses of topoi : they can either prove or disprove a given sentence; some can be used for both purposes, others for only one of them.

Most topoi are selected by certain formal features of the given conclusion; if, for example, the conclusion maintains a definition, we have to select our topos from a list of topoi pertaining to definitions, etc. Once we have selected a topos that is appropriate for a given conclusion, the topos can be used to construe a premise from which the given conclusion can be derived.

If the construed premise is accepted, either by the opponent in a dialectical debate or by the audience in public speech, we can draw the intended conclusion. It could be either, as some say, the premise of a propositional scheme such as the modus ponens, or, as others assume, as the conditional premise of a hypothetical syllogism.

Aristotle himself does not favor one of these interpretations explicitly. But even if he regarded the topoi as additional premises in a dialectical or rhetorical argument, it is beyond any doubt that he did not use them as premises that must be explicitly mentioned or even approved by the opponent or audience. This topic was not announced until the final passage of Rhet.

II, so that most scholars have come to think of this section as a more or less self-contained treatise. The insertion of this treatise into the Rhetoric is motivated by the claim that, while Rhet. In the course of Rhet. After an initial exploration of the field of delivery and style III. The following chapters III. Chapters III. Again metaphors are shown to play a crucial role for that purpose, so that the topic of metaphor is taken up again and deepened by extended lists of examples.

Chapter III. The philosophical core of Aristotle's treatise on style in Rhet. Originally the discussion of style belongs to the art of poetry rather than to rhetoric; the poets were the first, as Aristotle observes, to give an impulse for the study of style. Clarity again matters for comprehension and comprehensibility contributes to persuasiveness.

In prose speeches, the good formulation of a state of affairs must therefore be a clear one. However, saying this is not yet enough to account for the best or excellent prose style, since clear linguistic expressions tend to be banal or flat, while good style should avoid such banality. If the language becomes too banal it will not be able to attract the attention of the audience. The orator can avoid this tendency of banality by the use of dignified or elevated expressions and in general by all formulations that deviate from common usage.

On the one hand, uncommon vocabulary has the advantage of evoking the curiosity of an audience. On the other hand the use of such elevated vocabulary bears a serious risk: Whenever the orator makes excessive use of it, the speech might become unclear, thus failing to meet the default requirement of prose speech, namely clarity. Moreover, if the vocabulary becomes too sublime or dignified in relation to prose's subject matter Aristotle assumes it is mostly everyday affairs , the audience will notice that the orator uses his words with a certain intention and will become suspicious about the orator and his intentions.

Hitting upon the right wording is therefore a matter of being clear, but not too banal; In trying not to be too banal, one must use uncommon, dignified words and phrases, but one must be careful not to use them excessively or inappropriately in relation to prose style and the typical subject matter of prose speeches.

Bringing all these considerations together Aristotle defines the good prose style, i. In this respect the definition of stylistic virtue follows the same scheme as the definition of ethical virtues in Aristotle's ethical writings, insofar as both the stylistic virtue and the virtue of character are defined in terms of a mean that lies between two opposed excesses. If the virtue of style is defined as a mean between the banality involving form of clarity and overly dignified and hence inappropriate speech, it is with good reason that Aristotle speaks of only one virtue of prose style, and not of clarity, ornament by dignified expressions and appropriateness as three distinct virtues of style.

However, from the times of Cicero and Quintilianus on, these three, along with the correctness of Greek or Latin, became the canonical four virtues of speech virtutes dicendi. Reading Aristotle through the spectacles of the Roman art of rhetoric, scholars often try to identify two, three or four virtues of style in his Rhetoric. Finally, if the virtue of style is about finding a balance between banal clarity, which is dull, and attractive dignity, which is inappropriate in public speeches, how can the orator manage to control the different degrees of clarity and dignity?

Most examples that Aristotle gives of this latter class are taken from the different Greek dialects, and most examples of this type are in turn taken from the language of the Homeric epos. Further classes are defined by metaphors and by several expressions that are somehow altered or modified, e.

Sometimes Aristotle also uses the term kosmos under which he collects all epithets and otherwise ornamental expressions. These different types of words differ in accordance with their familiarity. The best established words, the kuria , make their subject clear, but do not excite the audience's curiosity, whereas all other types of words are not established, and hence have the sort of attraction that alien or foreign things used to have.

Since remote things are admirable thaumaston and the admirable is pleasant, Aristotle says, one should make the speech admirable and pleasant by the use of such unfamiliar words. However one has to be careful not to use inappropriately dignified or poetic words in prose speech. Thus the virtue of style is accomplished by the selection and balanced use of these various types of words: Fundamental for prose speech is the use of usual and therefore clear words.

In order to make the speech pleasant and dignified and in order to avoid banality the orator must make moderate use of non-familiar elements. Metaphor plays an important role for prose style, since metaphors contribute, as Aristotle says, clarity as well as the unfamiliar, surprising effect that avoids banality and tediousness.

These four types are exemplified as follows:. Most of the examples Aristotle offers for types i to iii would not be regarded as metaphors in the modern sense; rather they would fall under the headings of metonomy or synecdoche.

The examples offered for type iv are more like modern metaphors. Aristotle himself regards the metaphors of group iv , which are built from analogy, as the most important type of enthymemes. An analogy is given if the second term is to the first as the fourth to the third.

Correspondingly, an analogous metaphor uses the fourth term for the second or the second for the fourth. This principle can be illustrated by the following Aristotelian examples:. Examples a and b obey the optional instruction that metaphors can be qualified by adding the term to which the proper word is relative cp.

In example c , there is no proper name for the thing that the metaphor refers to. Metaphors are closely related to similes; but as opposed to the later tradition, Aristotle does not define the metaphor as an abbreviated simile, but, the other way around, the simile as a metaphor. See 1 question about The Art of Rhetoric…. Lists with This Book. Community Reviews. Showing Average rating 3. Rating details.

More filters. Sort order. Start your review of The Art of Rhetoric. Not Aristotle's clearest or best organized work, but still part of the core curriculum of a liberal education.

Why read Aristotle today? Because he is one of the greatest minds in Western history, and such a person's well-considered thoughts are inherently worth reading, if anything is. In addition, this book was deliberately aimed at those seeking to play an active role in a democratic society, to help them fulfill their function as citizens of a free society.

We in the West imagine ourselves mo Not Aristotle's clearest or best organized work, but still part of the core curriculum of a liberal education. We in the West imagine ourselves mostly to be members of a free society, and in fact take this for granted. But we tend not to participate in the political functioning of our society, and in general are not encouraged to do so.

Most particularly, we are not educated to do so. In the ancient world the idea of the liberal education was formed: an education fitting for a free man, that is, one who was a participating citizen of a democratic state. In ancient Greece the citizens themselves formed the government of their city-states, and every citizen might expect to hold a government post at one or more times in his life.

What knowledge did such a man need to fulfill his role in the best way? Which faculties should he cultivate and which suppress? Liberal education came to be envisaged as training in the seven "liberal arts": logic, grammar, rhetoric, mathematics, geometry, music, and astronomy. By medieval times these were split into two groups: a higher trivium consisting of the first 3, and a lower quadrivium consisting of the latter 4. For the art called logic is simply the art of how to think accurately about reality; the art of grammar is the art of expressing one's thoughts accurately in symbolic form, such as words; and the art of rhetoric is the art of persuading others of the validity of one's thoughts.

Aristotle's book is probably still the most important text on this third art of the trivium. In broad strokes, Aristotle analyzes rhetoric and finds that it has 3 main applications, namely judicial , or talking about past events; deliberative , or talking about future courses of action; and so-called epideictic , or talking about the present, which Aristotle says is mostly connected with formally praising and blaming people.

Facing one of these three tasks, the speaker or rhetor has 3 basic strategies of persuasion: logical argument, or persuasion via facts and logic; emotional argument, or finding language to arouse certain feelings in the audience; and the so-called moral argument, which consists in winning the audience's trust and good will through one's own character and demeanor.

Interestingly, Aristotle regards this last "argument" as the most persuasive element in a speech. In terms of persuasion, how we say things is more important than what we say. There are further detailed breakdowns of how to achieve these various aims, illustrated in many cases with examples. The translator, George A. Kennedy, provides a summary of the main points of each chapter, along with interesting historical material and some notes about how Aristotle fits in with the flow of ancient teaching on rhetoric generally for it was a subject keenly studied in both Greece and Rome.

For my taste there is perhaps more attention drawn than necessary to academic issues like the question of whether certain sections were later additions and other minutiae of translation.

In many cases he puts the original Greek term in brackets by the English word, which again is aimed at an academic reader. In general though I found the translator's comments useful and illuminating. Like all of Aristotle's surviving works, this is a technical manual all of his publications for the general reader have been lost , and so you need some determination to get through it.

But our society is becoming ever less free, and it's not going to become more free unless each of us takes responsibility for training ourselves to be free. It won't happen by itself; and our society--governments, schools, institutions--isn't doing it. A free society settles its differences through dialogue, not violence or fraud.

This book is still a major text on how to do that. As such, it's well worth our time and attention all these centuries after it was first written. Jul 19, Matt rated it it was ok. Aristotle defines. And The Art of Rhetoric is no exception. Aristotle disdained the sophist tradition of ancient Greece as much as Plato, but he also understood that rhetoric was a popular study of the day and it became another discipline he sought to master.

Rhetoric, when used appropriately, b Aristotle defines. Rhetoric, when used appropriately, becomes a tool of the dialectic instead of one that subverts. So begins the dissection of speech. There are three genres of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic and epideictic display. But regardless for what purpose the rhetorician speaks, there are three components to each speech: ethos the ethics of the speaker , pathos the emotions of the audience and logos the logic of the words.

What follows is a practical handbook for the orator. Part psychology, part theory part logic, The Art of Rhetoric lists considerations for the public speaker. In many ways, Book II resembles the Nicomachean Ethics in its utilitarian analysis of what drives human beings.

Aristotle covers the value and pitfalls of metaphor, similes and other devices. As with Book II, it is chocked full of examples of the good and bad. To fully appreciate The Art of Rhetoric , one must have a strong familiarity with its context. Undoubtedly, the competing schools of rhetoric defined Athenian education and Aristotle was competing against Isocrates for students.

Though most likely one of the first and most comprehensive collection of thoughts on the components of rhetoric, for the modern reader the ideas are at times dated and over generalized. The examples that Aristotle serves as benchmarks for various enthymemes truncated syllogisms relying on commonly understood principles are unknown to modern audiences.

Likewise, his rudimentary psychological analysis of his audience is overbroad though still impressive given his pioneering of this discipline at the time. For historical importance, this is most likely a five star work. But we have the advantage of not living in ancient Greece. In terms of enjoyment, and actual value for the modern reader, these ideas regarding communication and public speaking have been conveyed more clearly and effectively by other writers.

First, Aristotle: Surely everyone would agree that one or more of these is happiness. If, then happiness is some such thing, its elements must be: Gentle birth, a wide circle of friends, a virtuous circle of friends, wealth , creditable offspring, extensive offspring and a comfortable old age ; also the physical virtues e.

C, whose sayings were compiled in the Lieh Tzu Liezi in the 3rd or 4th century A. The first is long life, the second is reputation, the third is rank, and the fourth is riches.

Those who have these things fear ghosts, fear men, fear power, and fear punishment. They are called fugitives… Oriental Mythology ; Campbell, Joseph pg. Apr 19, Jesse Broussard rated it it was ok Shelves: mediocre. I'm sure it's excellent, necessary, brilliantly designed, etc.

But so is a sewer system, and you don't want to spend too much time there either. View 1 comment. May 01, AB rated it really liked it Shelves: antiquities. Right off the bat, Im not going to say I understood it all. I felt like a fish out of water for a bit with Aristotles discussions on enthymemes and syllogism and so on mostly because my previous experience with Classical Philosophy centred on choice passages relating to social history rather than on philosophy for philosophies sake.

I had read parts of his discussions on emotions for a social history class, but the bulk of the book was new for me. I went into it looking for a better understand Right off the bat, Im not going to say I understood it all.

I went into it looking for a better understanding of what Rhetoric is and the best ways to practice it. Ultimately, I believe I got that.

Aristotle is unbelievably insightful and I really have the desire to read more of his works to get a better picture of his skills of observation and thought. Mar 07, Felix rated it really liked it Shelves: literary-criticism , classical-period , philosophy , greek.

I think I finally figured out Aristotle! Before I read this, I didn't really connect with his thinking, but now I think I do. The Art of Rhetoric is an astoundingly comprehensive guide to the complex and delicate skill of oration.

It moves through three parts: firstly, Demonstration, secondly: Emotion and Character and thirdly: Universal Aspects, each one covering a different part of the skill. Aristotle leaves no stone unturned in his search for what makes great oration great.

As a result, there I think I finally figured out Aristotle! As a result, there are so many examples in this book that by the end of it, it's hard not to want to write a speech. Aristotle provides enough material to write a thousand speeches. It's important to note however, that this book is not light reading. In fact, it doesn't even really ask to be read at all. Aristotle is famously dry, but Rhetoric really takes the biscuit on dryness.

There are many arid deserts, both on, and indeed beyond, earth that are less dry than this book. What it really demands is not reading - but study.

Going through this book cover to cover was enlightening in many ways, and definitely gave me a strong appreciation for Aristotle's thinking, but it never seemed like this was the way it was meant to be read. Rhetoric is more of a handbook or maybe even a textbook for orators.

Jul 25, Paul Haspel rated it it was amazing Shelves: greece , ancient-greece , classical-culture , rhetoric. You may never have read anything by Aristotle; but if you've ever taken a college writing course, you've had him as your teacher. The Art of Rhetoric did so much to define how subsequent generations, and civilizations, regarded the task of crafting persuasive language that it can truly be regarded as a founding text. Methodically, Aristotle sets forth his sense of how the writer's handling of character and emotion contributes to success in rhetorical terms.

His insights regarding style and compo You may never have read anything by Aristotle; but if you've ever taken a college writing course, you've had him as your teacher. His insights regarding style and composition, written for a Greek audience of the 4th century B.

Readers sometimes find Aristotle's list-heavy style dry; unlike Plato, he does not present philosophical ideas in the form of a dialogue between characters. But his insights on rhetoric still do much to shape the way in which composition courses are taught at universities and colleges worldwide. He sets up the latter as an art of persuasion related to but nevertheless distinguishable from the former. After exploring the usefulness of syllogisms and enthymemes for both arts, Aristotle sets out his three basic categories of rhetorical discourse: deliberative, judicial or forensic , and epideictic.

He spends the rest of the first book exploring topics related to the Greek topos, for place useful for finding and constructing arguments in each of the three categories.

The second book is generally focused on pathos, ethos, and logos, with Aristotle cataloging the various ways rhetors can make use of emotion, character, and reason as means of persuasion. He works through emotions first, explaining how various emotions can be useful to rhetors as well as characterizing the states of minds of those feeling particular emotions.

Lastly, he delineates varieties of logical argument: examples, maxims, enthymemes, and topoi. Kennedy's edition also includes a translation of Gorgias' "Encomium of Helen. Jun 30, Anmol rated it liked it. This was about as exciting as reading through a dictionary. As an exercise in reading from cover to cover, however, this book is frustrating, though occasionally insi This was about as exciting as reading through a dictionary.

As an exercise in reading from cover to cover, however, this book is frustrating, though occasionally insightful. So I will present a review that is as fragmented and unreadable as Rhetoric itself, but hopefully also a little insightful. So I was probably not the target audience for this book. But I can still note that the book is weakened by the pointless digressions into defining qualities like the good, etc.

This really takes away from the quality of this book. But even Aristotle recognises that rhetoric can be wrongful and misleading at times. This book is interesting from a legal perspective, because Aristotle seems to believe in some form of legal formalism — Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges But later he upholds a Natural Law Theory perspective after all, Classical Natural Law Theory was put forward by Aquinas who studied Aristotle in depth — Universal law is the law of nature.

For there really is, as everyone to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is common to all, even to those who have no association or covenant with each other.

This is likely, considering that Macaulay who drafted the Code was a very well-read individual with knowledge of the ancient Greeks. It is unlikely that Aristotle decriminalised adultery, but his passage does read that way if we take into account the private vs public wrongs aspect of criminal theory.

Another interesting aspect is the equation of inductive reasoning with examples, and of deductive reasoning with enthymemes a word I had to look up within the first 3 pages of this book.

Aristotle and the pursuit of happiness — It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid. This end, to sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents. This seems to conflict with his popular image as a traditionalist-misogynist, at least in comparison to Plato, who was more progressive on the question of gender equality.

For example, he writes — All such good things as excite envy are, as a class, the outcome of good luck. This assumes that merited things cannot excite envy in others. I think they can. If someone works harder than us and becomes more successful, we can still feel envious towards them though if only through our own ignorance. Later, he writes — That which is praised is good, since no one praises what is not good.

This is laughably wrong and goes against the entire philosophical objective of finding the unpopular moral good and reeducating citizens of said good. Yet again, he writes — Thus, if the tallest man is taller than the tallest women, then men in general are taller than women. Aristotle thinks that this is a deduction. I fail to see how this can be valid. Excellence is greater than non-excellence, badness than non-badness; for excellence, goodness and badness are ends, which the mere absence of them cannot be.

The Buddha instead makes suffering the default position. Could this be like the glass half-full or half-empty problem? Sep 09, Carmen rated it it was ok Shelves: education. I need an Idiot's Guide type book to help me with this one because this is just not sinking in.

Perhaps I need to reread it. I'm not really a fan of rhetoric to begin with but this is certainly the book for orators, politicians, and lawyers to be. Proof, proof, proof, make sure you can back up what you say, but when you don't have proof, at least say it with style and panache, that's half the battle. An interesting read during election season. One of the most interesting moments in this boo I need an Idiot's Guide type book to help me with this one because this is just not sinking in.

One of the most interesting moments in this book is when Aristotle defines happiness: "If, then, happiness is some such thing, its elements must be: Gentle birth, a wide circle of friends, a virtuous circle of friends, wealth, creditable offspring, extensive offspring and a comfortable old age; also the physical virtues e.

The only rhetoric textbook a classical school should ever need I exaggerate slightly Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric has everything. And it's all brilliant. I've been using this Book I particularly as my 11th grade writing curriculum this year, and it's amazing. This translation Waterfield in particular is much easier for my students to grasp than other translations out there, and it doesn't take much to turn his advice here into a series of really practical writing assignment The only rhetoric textbook a classical school should ever need I exaggerate slightly This translation Waterfield in particular is much easier for my students to grasp than other translations out there, and it doesn't take much to turn his advice here into a series of really practical writing assignments.

Thousands of years after its publication, it still may be the best work on rhetoric out there.